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Bimal Pramanik and Purnima Naskar For a long time the glaring facts of Bangladeshi infiltration in West Bengal were restricted to brief (if not apologetic) reports in the Indian news media (both electronic and print) till the visible emergence of BJP in Delhi and West Bengal. And also, there was an undeclared prohibition on a discussion of Islamic terrorism because of the undeclared policy of Muslim appeasement of the Left Front, Congress and Trinamul Congress in West Bengal. Words like ‘infiltration’ ‘terrorism’ etc. were avoided by the so called secular parties due to vote bank politics. As a result, terrorists get safe corridor in this state and the normally high growth rate of Muslim population becomes higher due to infiltration; on the other side, this tends to strengthen to sectarian politics of Hindu too. Till today, not a single word has been spent by the Chief Minister of West Bengal on the  infiltration problem. Not even a single statement has been issued on the recent Khagragarh (Burdwan) blast and involvement of several private madrassas in West Bengal. It is a ‘dangerous silence’ for the state government. A hidden fear of losing Muslim votes is haunting her. Are the ordinary Muslims not against this terrorism? Why TMC failed to play a strong role against the vicious links of  infiltration and terrorism?  One simple logical proposition is, nearly all terrorists are Muslims, but all Muslims are not terrorists. Why should then the Muslim community as a whole feel irritated by any discussion regarding relations between terrorists and madrassas? May be someone related with these madrassas can be irritated. Apart from that, all Muslim youths are not madrassa students and all of them do not subscribe to the terrorist mindset. Why then the TMC suffers from a fear to lose Muslim votes?  Is there any need of madrassa education in the twenty first century?  The need of the hour is an open discussion on this topic. Where are the difficulties? Madrassas may be necessary for religious education, but terrorists are using these institutes to fulfill their purposes. It is not only true in West Bengal or India; it is also true in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Syria and other countries in the world. Now it is amply clear like day light, madrassas are used to spread terrorism in most of the South Asian countries. And majority of the victims are Muslims as in Pakistan. So, how many madrassas are really needed to teach religion in this state of West Bengal, and what are the ways to control them properly; it is not merely a subject/affecting non-Muslims, it should be a matter of concern to the Muslim community also. Terrorism represents a vital component of the problem of large scale infiltration though Indo- Bangladesh border. Though infiltration is a reality, it is not possible for the Indian people to welcome this  extra burden of population. A clear government policy should be enunciated on this matter, and a wide discussion is needed in the society. It is not simply a religious problem; it is a problem of society, economy and polity. Bangladesh Link:  In the nineteen eighties, planned migration from Bangladesh conformed to the lebensraum theory, which was encouraged by most of the Indian Muslims in the border states under the protection and patronization of some political and social forces of India’s Eastern and North Eastern region. This continuous infiltration from across the border is slowly and steadily changing the demographic pattern in the border areas, especially in the States of West Bengal and Assam. This changed demographic scenario easily lends itself to disrupting social harmony. Already it has taken a shape of demographic invasion in the region, which is threatening our secular polity and national security. This is a religio–cultural process taking place in a geographical space considered to be strategically important. Thus the emergence of Bangladesh has created in the North- Eastern States of India certain conditions conducive to Islamisation. At least three factors, facilitating the process of Islamisation, are obvious. First, strangely enough, whatever Islamisation has occurred in these parts of North- Eastern and Eastern India has happened within a secular political environment. Secondly, the appeasement of aliens for the purpose of garnering votes and the continuous anti-Centre stance have been conducive to the expansion of a psyche of Islamisation. Thirdly, a weak undefined and unorganized secular frame has failed to combat the process of Islamisation. A lot of information has been published on madrassa related terrorist networks  in West Bengal and Assam in particular,  and India in general. Now is the right time for discussion and thinking of its political and social implications especially in the context of  Bangladeshi thoughts in  the nineteen eighties regarding it. Leading Bangladeshi strategic analysts and members of the intelligentsia introduced the theory of lebensraum in the 1980s. They claim that their right to settle in India’s eastern and north-eastern states is to be considered as the natural course of overriding, what is to them, an unacceptable political demarcation of the border.        Growing population pressure and crippling poverty and pauperization of the marginal rural masses in Bangladesh encouraged, if not forced, them to put the agenda of migration as a life and death question. In the mean time, the consolidation of Islamic forces was apparent. Islamists adopted the agenda of a greater Islamic region as a grand political strategy. Although it was an emotional issue of Sheikh Mujib, later it became a political and strategic issue with the support of Pakistan. Besides, both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border are inhabited by a population which is ethnically, linguistically and religiously identical. It has thus become easy for the insurgent outfits to wage a proxy war at an unpublicized level. The costs and risks of this war are low, and yet it destabilizes the security of eastern and north eastern India. Harkat-ul-Mujahidin(HuM), Bangladesh Jamat-e-Islami (BJI), etc. and their counterparts in India are reaping benefits with the help of some local Indian political and social forces for spreading …

Socio-political implications of Khagragarh (Burdwan) blasts in West Bengal Read More »

Jayanta Kumar Ray National Research Professor, Government of India & Honorary Adviser, Centre for Research in Indo-Bangladesh Relations, Kolkata. In 1951, independent India carried out its first Census operations.  A National Register of Citizens (NRC), containing the names of Indian citizens, also came into existence in the same year, viz. 1951, under a directive from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).  The Citizenship Act 1955, and the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003, will govern the preparation of the current updating of the NRC for the State of Assam.  Legacy data  form  the foundation of this updating, and comprise, as proofs of presence in Assam or in any other part of  India on or before 24 March 1971 the names of persons ( or their descendants) who appear in the NRC 1951 or in the Electoral Rolls or in the admissible documents up to the above noted date. A person who wants inclusion of his/her name in the updated NRC, has to provide the Legacy data confirming his or her ancestor’s name in the pre-1971 documents noted above. NRC compilation is divided into four phases: (1) Distribution and Receipt of Application Form; (2) Verification; (3) Publication of Draft NRC and Receipt of Claims/Objections; (4) Final Publication of NRC.  Digitised government data provide a transparent and technology-based process of verification of the legacy data submitted by an NRC applicant.  Thus, all potential citizens are given a fair opportunity. The NRC update is a highly controversial issue in Assam and various parts of India, especially in the neighbouring States of Assam.  The NRC published in 1951 lacks total validity because it is not deemed to be complete.  Members of indigenous tribes were not in a position to submit pre-1971 documents to prove their identity.  The Supreme Court of India has affirmed that, in accordance with 2003 Citizenship Rules, members of the Tea Tribes of Assam are to be treated as original inhabitants of Assam. Since 1951, Assam is the only Indian State attempting an NRC update.  This was the principal consequence of the 1985 Assam Accord, which itself was a product of the six-year long anti-foreigners agitation in Assam.  Although the objective of update is to identify, detain and deport illegal Bangladeshi migrants, Muslim leaders denounce the move as an instrument to render the Muslim community stateless. The issue has appeared and reappeared in various forms since 1905, when India’s Viceroy Lord Curzon divided Bengal, merged a part of it with Assam, and created a Muslim-majority province in north-east India.  Bengali Hindus fought hard against the 1905 Bengal Partition, and got it repealed in 1911.  Bengali Hindus thus saved the Assamese from Muslim domination, and preserved Assam’s identity and dignity. In 1937, due to the introduction of provincial autonomy under the 1935 Government of India Act, the Congress Party came to power in Assam.  An Assamese political leader became the Chief Minister.  But he could not counteract the domination of Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims.  One wonders whether the alienation of Assamese Hindus from Bengali Hindus, originating at that time, probably persisted till the Partition of British India in 1947, and Assamese leaders did not object to Sylhet (including Bengali Hindus) being joined to Pakistan.  But this meant an irreparable loss for Assamese Hindus as Muslim influx from Bangladesh upset the demographic balance in Assam, and provided an impetus to the updating of NRC.  At this juncture, Bengali-speaking Hindus and Assamese-speaking Hindus should make a common cause. The circumstances of the Partition of 1947 (as also pledges from India’s political leaders) confer on Hindus (and other non-Muslims) in Bangladesh an inalienable right to come to India as refugees, and then settle down.  More so because East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh has been carrying out ceaseless and ruthless pogroms against Hindus (an overwhelming majority of persecuted non-Muslims) in order to drive them out of the country.  In the early years of independence, some law makers in India had the pragmatism to maintain a distinction between Hindus (refugees) and Muslims (infiltrators). The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950 drew this distinction, and treated Muslim migrants as illegal aliens.  But this farsightedness of the Indian authorities did not last long; the Act of 1950 was repealed in 1957.  Yet, for some years, remnants of this farsightedness survived, unpublicised, in the shape of an administrative order of the Government of India, which empowered a district magistrate to grant citizenship to Hindus from East Pakistan residing in India for more than six months.  When authorities rescinded this order within a few years, they acquiesced in the creation of a situation in which, eventually, Muslim infiltrators would move to be a menace to India’s security. In Assam, even before Partition, self-seeking politicians orchestrated organised moves for decades to lure Muslims away from East Bengal to Assam, and thereby alter Assam’s demographic balance.  These moves persisted after 1947, and rendered unjustified the tendency of liberals to ignore religion while examining the issue of migration.1 In 1964, the Government of Assam enacted the Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan (PIP) Act.  The fate of this PIP Act demonstrated how Muslim leaders could use political blackmail to sabotage any effort by authorities to strengthen security by curbing infiltration.  Bimala Prasad Chaliha, Assam’s chief minister, played an energetic part in arranging deportations of a large number of infiltrators to East Pakistan.  He did not respect Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s desire for a liberal approach towards Muslim migrants, for, as Chaliha stressed, a severe threat to Assam’s demography and culture was emerging. But Chaliha’s determination failed to override the manoeuvres of Muslim legislators to stall the anti-infiltrator programme.  Chaliha’s Congress Party did not enjoy a stable majority in the legislature, and his health was fragile.  Therefore, 20 Muslim legislators of the Congress Party (in a legislature of 126 members) could threaten Chaliha with defections leading to the collapse of Chaliha’s ministry. The PIP Act became inoperative in a few months, after it came into force.2 Assam’s Muslim …

National Register of Citizens (NRC) Read More »

Bimal Pramanik and Mintu Barua Immediately after Bangladesh became independent, a process was set in motion to include the country in the Islamic block. Although mainstream Awami League (AL) leadership tried to establish the freedom struggle on a nationalistic pedestal, culturally there was little transition from the Islamic psyche to the Bengali psyche in post-independence Bangladesh.  After the death of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, the process of Islamisation completely over-shadowed Bangladesh.  Although religion is an important subject matter for the common people of Bangladesh, there was a great chance of shaping Bangladeshi polity on the basis of the ideals of democracy and secularism, following the success of the liberation war in 1971, which upheld these ideals. A few people persisted in pursuing these ideals, but the dreadful massacre of liberation war leadership, including Sheikh Mujibar Rahman in 1975, drastically changed the fate of the ideal of secularism. Later, even the Awami League, which adhered to the ideals of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, failed to embrace the principles of secular political practice. Emergence of Islamic Extremist Groups in Bangladesh To a large extent, at the fag end of Pakistan rule and the early period of Bangladesh, AL did not use religion as the primary source of its political influence. The use of religion in Bengladeshi politics started after the killing of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman in 1975. Religious influence flooded the society, like tidal waves. Even Sheikh Hasina, leader of a liberal democratic party like AL, performed Hajj a number of times and wore hejab. She had to sign a five point agreement on religiosity with a fundamentalist party,  Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), for the purpose of holding the Muslim vote bank.1  Moreover, she retained such provisions as “Bisssmillah-er-Rahaman-er-Rahim” in the preamble to the Constitution of Bangladesh, and “Islam as State Religion”,  (15th Amendment in 2011), in spite of receiving the judgement for abolition of the 5th and 8th amendments which contained these provisions, from the highest court of the country. From all such events, we can easily gauge the overall situation of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib and other national leaders were killed due to an army coup. General Ziaur Rahman captured power in connivance with the Islamic and Pakistani Lobby. At the time of General Zia, Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist outfits engulfed Bangladesh polity and society rapidly. The concept of international Islamic solidarity began to gain ground in the society, and the role of political leadership was important in this regard. In the early 1980s, a lot of Madrassa students were recruited as volunteers to fight in Afghanistan and Jammu-Kashmir as a part of international jihad, which is an open secret today. No political parties and social organizations protested against these activities. Actually, most of the people thought that it was an attempt at building Islamic solidarity and unity. Gradually, a large number of students from Bangladeshi quami madrassas joined the international radical Islamic terrorist network, and thus Bangladesh got importance in the Islamic countries. Subsequently, a rapid growth was observed in the sector of Islamic NGOs. During 1982—1990,  Maolana Abdul Mannan, former AL Badr, 2  i.e. collaborator of Pakistan in 1971 liberation war, acted as the Minister of Religious Affairs in General H.M. Ershad’s Cabinet, and also remained the leader of Jamiatul Mudarresin (an umbrella organization of Bangladesh Quami Madrassas). Abdul Mannan played a vital role to organise jihadi cadres (radical Islamic terrorists) from Quami Madrassas for Afghanistan and Jammu-Kashmir wars, while he enjoyed the patronage of General Ershad. Expansion of Terrorist Networks in Bangladesh with the Connivance of Government After the defeat of the Soviet Union in Kabul, a large number of radical Islamic terrorists started to return back to Bangladesh from Afghanistan, Jammu-Kashmir and Pakistan. At this juncture, a number of new terrorist outfits emerged in Bangladesh, e.g. Harkatul Jihad, Harkatul Mujahidin, Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, etc. These organizations gained importance all over the country and abroad. Since the mid-1980s, Bangladesh state and society were getting recognised as a safe haven for all kinds of terrorists. A good number of the most wanted Indian terrorists settled in Bangladesh with the help of their friends or former classmates at Deobandh Madrassa of Uttar Pradesh in India. Their Bangladeshi friends played a very important role in providing jobs to them in Madrassas, and food shelter among local sympathizers. A good number of former Bangladeshi students of Deobondh fought in Afghanistan, Jammu-Kashmir and other places in India along with Indian terrorists. From the 1980s, for two-three decades, Bangladeshi governments and administration sponsored several terrorist outfits, including radical Islamic outfits, to carry out sabotage on the Indian soil. This matter is now an open secret. Nevertheless, Bangladeshi governments and administration always denied these facts. During Hasina’s tenure, from 2009 onwards, the hidden truth about the activities of radical Islamic outfits, and a group of Indian terrorist organisations from north-east India came to light.  On the other hand, Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) established foreign branches in Malda, Murshidabad and Nadia in West Bengal and different districts in Assam, which have now been disclosed by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) after it started investigations into the Khagragarh blast (Burdwan) of 2014.3 It is mentionable that during the tenure of the caretaker government (2006—2008) of Bangladesh, six top leaders of JMB were hanged after a close-door summary trial in 2007. After this incident, a good number of JMB leaders and cadres took shelter in West Bengal and Assam. After the Khagragarh blast, all these facts have gradually come out in the press due to the investigations conducted by the NIA. Internal and International Pressure that Unmasked Bangladesh   Leaders of radical Islamic terrorist groups in Bangladesh thought that Bangladesh had a conducive atmosphere for Islamic revolution, and therefore, they launched an offensive with the connivance of BNP—BJI alliance government.  The alliance government played a very minimal role to suppress it. Incidentally, when more than 500 bombs exploded at a time all over Bangladesh on 17 August 2005, international agencies sharply reacted. Bangladesh apparently worked as a terrorist state in …

Background and Development of Islamic Terrorism in Bangladesh Read More »

Bimal Pramanik Director, Centre for Research in Indo-Bangladesh Relations (CRIBR), Kolkata. A change in the demographic pattern of a country is an obvious result of migration, which is as old as human civilization.  But if the change is significantly high in a short span of time, it is bound to cause a social concern for the country experiencing this phenomenon. According to Pakistan (East) and Bangladesh Census from 1951 to 2011, Hindu population declined significantly in every Census period.  All the refugees who had been coming to West Bengal during Pakistani days were Hindus.  In the Bangladesh era, Hindus are coming as usual as in the days of Pakistan due to religious persecution and political pressure.  In the 1941 Census, under the British rule, Hindu population was 28% in East Bengal, i.e. in present Bangladesh.  Post Partition dismal picture of decadal Hindu population percentages is shown in the trend line:         Source :  Bangladesh Population Census 2011. As observed from the Bangladesh Population Census of 2011, the share of Hindu population has come down to 8.5% only.  During the last sixty years since 1951 (1951—2011), the comparatively lower growth rate of Hindus indicates a steady migration of Hindu population from Bangladesh to India, particularly to the state of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. On the other hand, in West Bengal, growth rates of Hindus and Muslims are 230.81% and 400.56% respectively during 1951—2011.  Population share of Hindus and Muslims in 1951 was 78.45% and 19.85% respectively, but during the last sixty years, the share of Hindus in West Bengal has come down to 70.54%—a  decrease by 7.91% in spite of a massive Hindu migration as refugees  from East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh after Partition of India in 1947, whereas the share of Muslims has increased by 27.01%—an  increase of 7.16%1 because of high growth rate and massive Muslim infiltration from Bangladesh to West Bengal particularly during 1971 to 2011. Changes in religious demography of West Bengal during 1951-1971 (trend line) are shown below. During the 1951-2011 period, the contrast between a decline in Hindu population and an extraordinary upswing in Muslim population is indeed remarkable in every district of the state of West Bengal.  In a number of districts, the rate of growth of the Muslim population is double or more than double that of the Hindu population. In the state of Assam, there is a significant trend of religious-demographic changes from 1951 to 2011.  If we consider the NRC period, i.e. 1971 onwards, it is a clear trend of massive growth of Muslims in Assam observed after the liberation of Bangladesh.  Examples from four Censuses of Assam, i.e. 1971, 1991, 2001 and 2011, illustrate the trend line of percentage of religious population, as mentioned below: 2 Only within forty years, Hindu population declined more than 11%, and there was an extra-ordinary upswing of Muslim population by about 10%. It is a grave threat to the very existence of Assamese Hindus.  Apart from that, the following nine districts of Assam have now more than 50% to 80% of Muslim population, although Muslims did not form a majority in 1971; in some other districts, there is a significant growth of Muslim population observed since 1971.3 Sl. No. Name of district Muslim population (%) 1 Dhubri 79.67 2 Goalpara 57.52 3 Barpeta 70.74 4 Morigaon 52.56 5 Naogaon 55.36 6 Karimganj 56.36 7 Hailakandi 60.31 8 Darrrang 64.34 9 Bongaigaon 50.22  There was not a single Muslim majority district in 1971 in Assam, but after delimitation of districts in 1991, five districts became Muslim majority only within twenty years from 1971.  After another twenty years, i.e. in 2011, nine districts became Muslim majority out of twenty seven.  We can cite an important example: before delimitation in 1971, there was only 16% Muslim population in Darrang district. In 1991, Darrang and Sonitpur became two districts after delimitation, and the percentage of Muslim population became 32% and 13% respectively.  In 2011, Darrang witnessed a massive jump of Muslims from 32% to more than 64% within twenty years only. Considering the above demographic situation, on 8 November 1998, Lieutenant General S. K. Sinha, the Governor of Assam, submitted an extensive report to the President of India on the grave threat posed by the influx of people from Bangladesh to Assam.  He said:           “The dangerous consequences of large scale illegal migration from Bangladesh, both for the people of Assam and more for the Nation as a whole, need to be emphatically stressed.  No misconceived and mistaken notions of secularism should be allowed to come in the way of doing so”. “As a result of population movement from Bangladesh, the spectre looms large of the indigenous people of Assam being reduced to a minority in their home state.  Their cultural survival will be in jeopardy, their political control will be weakened and their employment opportunities will be undermined”. “The silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in the loss of the geo-strategically vital districts of lower Assam.  The influx of illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim majority region.  It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made.  The rapid growth of international Islamic fundamentalism may provide the driving force for this demand.  In this context, it is pertinent that Bangladesh has long discarded secularism and has chosen to become an Islamic state.  Loss of lower Assam will sever the entire land mass of the North-East, from the rest of India and the rich natural resources of that region will be  lost to the Nation”4.  Just after independence of Bangladesh, on 8 September 1972, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, a senior-most leader of Bangladesh, was speaking in a public meeting at Paltan Maidan, Dhaka.  He said, “Bangla speaking areas of India and Bangladesh will form greater Bengal including Bangladesh, West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura.  Greater Bengal movement has already gathered momentum, army of Indira Gandhi will not be able to suppress …

Demographic Changes in Eastern India, and the need for a National Register of Citizens Read More »

Bimal Pramanik and Kasturi Bhadra Ray The Partition of India in 1947 saw an onslaught of refugees from Pakistan (from eastern and western parts) into India. Displaced migrants started pouring into India in the wake of communal disturbances preceding and following Independence (Dey and Chakraborty1994).This has continued unchecked especially in the Eastern part of the Country,even after East Pakistan became an independent country,namely,Bangladesh in  1971. Though migrants from Bangladesh to India were primarily Hindus, Muslims also formed a part of the flow, mainly for economic reasons. The migrants from Bangladesh are primarily settled in West Bengal and neighbouring states, one of which is Orissa. A study was conducted among 400 women in Nadia and Murshidabad districts of West Bengal, and Kendrapara of Orissa, where there are large settlements of migrants from Bangladesh. The study tried to take a look at the work status of the female migrants. The study focussed on females especially, because over the years, the percentage of females among the migrants from Bangladesh to India has been on the rise (from 46.21% in 1971 to 52.79%   in 2001 in accordance with Census of India 1971-2001). Participation in economic activity of the female migrants in the survey areas has been examined and reasons behind different levels of participation have been analysed. In the study areas of West Bengal and Orissa, four blocks were chosen from the two district of West Bengal (Murshidabad and Nadia) in consultation with local people, officials and Panchayat members. In Murshidabad, the four blocks selected were Murshidabad –Jiaganj of Lalbagh subdivision, Raninagar II, Jalangi and Domkal blocks from Domkal subdivision .In Nadia, Chakdaha block from Kalyani subdivision and three blocks namely Karimpur-1, Karimpur-2 and Tehatta-1 from Tehatta subdivision were chosen. In Orissa’s Kendrapara district where the study was concentrated, one block, namely Mahakalapada block was chosen after consultation with the local people, officials and the Panchayat members regarding area-wise concentration of migrants. The women in the survey areas have been divided into groups of five year period. The age distribution is seen to vary amongst the different survey areas (Table 1). Table 1: Age distribution of the female migrants (Percentage) Age Group Lalbagh Domkal Kalyani Tehatta Kendrapara 0-14 0.00 0.00 0.00 – – 15-19 0.00 1.31 1.42 2.77 – 20-24 5.00 3.96 0.00 9.72 6.00 25-29 5.00 10.52 12.85 15.27 14.00 30-34 11.25 15.78 12.85 12.50 19.00 35-39 6.25 15.78 28.57 27.77 20.00 40-44 8.75 18.42 12.85 13.88 16.00 45-49 5.00 13.15 11.42 13.88 14.00 50-54 16.25 13.15 8.57 2.77 3.00 55-59 3.75 5.26 2.85 -1.38 3.00 60-64 20.00 1.31 5.71 — 2.00 65+ 18.75 1.31 2.85 – 3.00 Mean Age 49 years 40 years 39 years 35 years 37 years Source: Survey data The main concentration is in Lalbagh (30-54 years), but there is a substantial percentage (38.75%) in the 60 years plus age group. In Domkal and Kalyani   the women under the survey belong to the   25-54 years age category mainly, though in Tehatta, the women were from a lower age cluster (20-49 years). In Kendrapara, the respondents primarily belonged to 25-49 years. Quite a few women in Lalbagh belong to the 60 years and above   category, but this is for Lalbagh only. In the other areas, very low percentages of the women migrants belong to this age category. Also, in Lalbagh, Domkal, Kalyani, Tehatta and Kendrapara, none of the   women migrants   were from the 0-14 year’s age group. The average age of the women varies from 35 years in Tehatta,  37 years in Kendrapara, 39 years in Kalyani, 40 years in Domkal to 49 years in Lalbagh All the females chosen for the study in Lalbagh and Kalyani in West Bengal and Kendrapara, Orissa were Hindus, the areas being predominantly Hindu, but in Domkal and Tehatta of West Bengal the females were broadly divided between Hindus and Muslims. Table 2: Religious composition of the female migrants (Percentage) Religion Lalbagh Domkal Kalyani Tehatta Kendrapara Hindu 100.00 57.89 100.00 54.16 100.00 Muslim – 42.10 – 45.83 – Christian – – – – – Buddhist – – – – – Others – – – – – No Reply – – – – – Source: Survey Data 57.89% of the females were Hindus in Domkal, and 54.16% in Tehatta. Work Status An examination of the data on work participation of the women reveals a huge disparity among the female migrants in the survey areas of West Bengal and Orissa.Almost all of them are engaged in economic activities in Orissa, but in the study areas of West Bengal, only 25% in Lalbagh, 15.78% in Domkal, 7.14% in Kalyani and 12.50% in Tehatta are engaged in economic activity. Amongst the women workers in Lalbagh, 5.26% work as agricultural labourers. But the women are mainly engaged in the biri making (52.63%) and 42.10% work as maids or cooks in other households Table 3: Sector wise distribution of the working women migrants (Percentage)   Lalbagh Domkal Kalyani Tehatta Kendrapara Cultivator 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 Agricultural labourer 5.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.96 Household industries 52.63 66.66 75.00 0.00 1.01 Others 42.10 33.33 25.00 100.00 20.20  Source: Survey data                        (N.B: Women engaged in biri making have been shown under ‘household industries’ and those working as maids have been classified under ‘others’. N.B.2: In Kendrapara, the total is not 100% because some women are engaged in more than one occupation) The paltry 15.78% women, who are engaged in regular employment work in Domkal, also work in the biri industry or as maids (Table 3).  This is again observed in the case of Kalyani where the very low percentage who are engaged regular employment, work in either the biri industry or as domestics in other households.In Tehatta, only 12.5% are employed, primarily in livestock tending. So overall in the survey areas of West Bengal, where work participation rate is low, the women are mostly working as biri maker, as domestics or as livestock tenders. However, in Orissa, the distribution picture of the women migrants engaged in various sectors is very different …

Work Status of female migrants/infiltrators from Bangladesh in West Bengal and Orissa Read More »