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Jayanta Kumar Ray National Research Professor, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India & Honorary Adviser, Centre for Research in Indo-Bangladesh Relations, Calcutta. Rakhine (known as Arakan during British rule) is a province of Myanmar. Buddhists form a majority in Rakhine. But, Muslims, according to one assessment, emerged in Rakhine (Arakan) as early as 8th century AD, and the distinctiveness of Rakhine Muslims (Rohingyas or Chittagonian Muslims or Chittagonian Bengali Muslims) became evident by the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries.1 A UN Report on Rohingyas, prepared by a human rights organization, also claims that Rohingyas came to the region in the 8th century.2 However, there is another view that Rohingyas never had millennia long connection with the Arakan state as it is a fabricated story that has no academic acceptability.3 Interestingly, from 1950s, the term ‘Rohingya’ began to be used by the direct descendents of Muslim migrants from Chittagong.4 In 1785, the Konbaung Dynasty of Burma occupied Rakhine. Later, the Anglo-Burmese War (1824-26) started, and the British conquered the whole of what they called Arakan (currently Rakhine). Bengali Muslims began to migrate to Arakan, which was encouraged by the British. From 1826 onwards, British companies had been recruiting Bengali Muslims in Arakan in commercial ventures, like mining, cutting of teak trees, constructing roads and bridges, etc. It led to massive Muslim migration, which continued for more than a century. There was a significant economic reason behind the massive migration of Bengali Muslims from Chittagong to Burma. Compare to Bengal, wages in Arakan were very high.5 In the estimate of Burmans, who comprise the ethnic majority in Myanmar, a majority of the Muslims currently living in Rakhine are the descendants of the migrants from Chittagong, located in present day Bangladesh. During colonial rule, Chittagonian immigrants turned into a dominant group in some parts of Burma.6 Burmans form the ruling circle, although since 1962, the military have (visibly or invisibly) governed the country, and their concept of the essentials of Burmese national culture excludes Rakhine Muslims, obliterating even the distinction between Muslims living in the pre-British era, and those arriving in the British era.7 It is important to keep in mind that the Government of Myanmar considers 1826 as a watershed regarding the issue of conferring citizenship rights on the Rohingyas.8 One striking fact is that unlike any Muslim-majority country, despite having its own Buddhist identity, Burma was a tolerant country and did not declare Buddhism as state religion. Moreover, non-Buddhists had complete freedom to practise their religion, and more significantly, public opinion in Burma was not in favour of conversion from one religion to another.9 None of these progressive features can be observed in any Muslim country in the world. Indeed, British conquest of Burma drastically changed the status quo of Burmese society due to a huge Muslim migration from India. With the substantial growth of immigrants in Burma, Muslims began to develop their religious activities to the fullest extent, such as building of mosques and other religious institutions, which Burmese Muslims had never done before.10 After the declaration of the British government that Arakan was a part of Bengal presidency, Muslim population in Arakan increased in a colossal fashion, and subsequently reached twenty percent of the total population. Ceaseless Bengali Muslim migration to Arakan led to clashes between Bengali Muslims and the Buddhists. The clash between Buddhists and Rakhine Muslims, currently called Rohingyas, became inevitable, especially because of violent anti-Buddhist activities of the Rohingyas, such as destruction of Buddhist temples, forceful conversion to Islam, etc. The British did nothing to stop such violence conducted by the Rohingyas. Later, during the time of the Second World War, Rohingyas supported the British, whereas Buddhists supported Japan. The British government provided arms to Rohingyas, which were used to kill Buddhists. In 1942, Rohingyas killed 20,000 Buddhists in Northern Arakan. When Japan occupied some parts of Burma, the British government formed Volunteers Force to provide arms training to Rohingyas to fight against the Japanese, and Rohingyas used those arms against the Rakhine Buddhists. Rohingyas killed Rakhine Buddhists and destroyed their religious institutions.11          In 1948, when Burma got independence, Rohingyas refused to be citizens of Burma, and requested M.A. Jinnah to include Arakan in East Pakistan. Nevertheless, Jinnah turned down their request. The reason behind Jinnah’s refusal was not far to seek.  The Eastern part of Pakistan (called East Bengal till 1956) had a population already exceeding that of the Western part of Pakistan. To add Rakhine Muslims to East Pakistan was to aggravate the population disparity between the two parts of Pakistan—which was a distinct disadvantage in the political arithmetic of any democratic system. Under these circumstances, Rohingyas formed the Mujahid Party in 1948 with an ambition of establishing a Muslim state in Northern Arakan. From 1948 to 1962, Rohingyas destroyed countless Buddhist temples and cultural centres.12 Subsequently, in 1962, this situation changed when General Ne Win came to power through a military coup. The Ne Win government passed an exclusionary Citizenship Act, which made three categories of citizens–National, Associate, and Naturalised–in 1982. Full citizenship was conferred on 135 national races, officially declared as indigenous groups, who have proven record of ancestry in Burma before 1823, i.e. prior to the first Anglo-Burmese War.13 It is important to remember that even in 1971, Burma (called Myanmar since 1989) provided shelter to 75,000 Bengali Muslims, who had been tortured by the West Pakistani military, seeking safety in Burma. The Islamic terrorist organisation, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), formerly known as Harakah-al-Yakin, wants to establish an Islamic state in Myanmar. It is an undeniable fact that Islamic terrorism is largely responsible for today’s crisis in Myanmar. Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and a number of Arab states are providing all kinds of resources to the Muslim jihadis in Myanmar, which plays a key role to intensify the crisis.14 Significantly, for a long time, Bangladesh has been patronising the Rohingya terrorists. In 1978, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) was formed in Chittagong, and it provided arms training to the local …

An essay on the Rohingya crisis Read More »

Bimal Pramanik Political leadership in India has always subscribed to commonality in the region and the need to cooperate, instead of looking at diversities and differing perceptions from a narrow, sectarian perspective. As early as August 1983, when SAARC was not even formally born, Mrs Indira Gandhi, addressing the foreign ministers of South Asia, said: ‘Our cooperation in no way limits each country’s freedom of judgment. It is allied solely to development and to the strengthening of the economics of our individuals countries. Let us not be disheartened if we have some difficulties and differences to contend with —– our very cooperation will increase our capacity to withstand pressure. With unity we can hope to move ahead to a future of freedom, peace and prosperity.’1 At the time of establishment of this regional forum (SAARC) in 1980s there were some declared objectives but some hidden agenda also. Bilateral relations of the regional countries, particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal with India were not so warm at that time; rather, it was strained in the fields of politics and economics. In absence of deep rooted democracy or democratic environment in those countries, perception of regional development among the political leadership was hazy. Bilateral issues dominated in the field of the foreign policy because of lack of foresight of the possibilities of common regional development. It was a fact that the nature of the existing bilateral issues with neighbouring countries was not simple, and prospects of solving them hardly bright. Particularly, with Pakistan and Bangladesh, it was  the continuing vendetta of partition. Apart from that, neighbouring countries of India have been trying hard to internationalize some bilateral issues and condemning India’s intervention in them, e.g.  the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan was not ready to admit that it was the wrong policy of Pakistan that led to the separation of its eastern province.         Though the SAARC members do not face a common threat to security, they have a sort of common allergy to India. Overwhelming predominance of India in South Asia is a major handicap for the smooth sailing of SAARC. In short, the gigantic size of India is generally regarded as an inimical factor in the development of regional cooperation in south Asia.2 Apart from size; there is an enormous disparity between India and its wary neighbours in terms of population, resources, military might and the level of economic and technological development. In South Asia, India is centrally situated while other members of SAARC are located in the periphery. As a result of this peculiarity, each country of the region is closely related to India socio- culturally, economically and politico-strategically. Moreover, it is due to the peculiar geographical position of India that numerous problems and tensions frequently erupt between India and its neighbours. Periodical border clashes and the alarming problem of migration, which are the by–products of this unique socio economic, political and geographical feature, hamper the smooth progress of SAARC. It is no exaggeration to say that there is the inevitable presence of India, to a considerable extent, in every other country of South Asia. In other words, India has strong cultural, religious, historical and political bonds with the South Asian countries. The uniqueness of South Asia is considered to be a basic problem which is uncongenial to the promotion of regional cooperation in this region. The region of South Asia is marked by the presence of great disparities which rarely exist in any other part of the globe; again, there are very few regions in the world which share such strong cultural affinities like South Asia. In Western Europe, the original members of the European Economic Community (EEC) were more or less equal in terms of status, power, population and resources, but each of them had long separate historical and cultural   tradition which led to the development of separate national identities. The seven constituent states of SAARC(at the time of establishment)  were unequal in status, size, population, possession of natural resources and the level of economic development. These types of dissimilarities have not been conducive to the uninhibited growth of regional cooperation in South Asia.3 Since its very inception, the normal activities of SAARC have been inhibited by the strained bilateral relations between India and its neighbours. A number of irritants have often marred the apparently cordial relations between India and the other member states of SAARC. India’s conflictual relations with most of the neighbours no doubt have an adverse effect on the overall performance of SAARC, but it is Indo-Pak hostility since 1947-48 that accounts for a major part of success or failure of SAARC. Indeed, Indo-Pak rivalry lies at the root of all troubles in South Asia. There are several contentious issues between these two rival countries, of which Kashmir problem is the foremost. The Kashmir imbroglio has triggered four armed conflicts between these two countries so far.  In order to further complicate the bilateral relations, Pakistan even attempted to fish in the troubled waters between India and other neighbours. In addition to this, Pakistan even tried to gang up with the smaller neighbours against India by exploiting their grievances against India. Pakistan suffers from a paranoia that its economy is going to be swamped by the huge Indian economy. This is why Pakistan opposed the launching of South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) proposed by India. Later on, although Pakistan accepted SAPTA, it had not granted the ‘Most Favoured Nation (MFN)’ status to India, while India had already accorded the same to Pakistan 4. Thus, the continuing animosities and mutual suspicion between India and Pakistan on Kashmir explains the slow progress of SAARC. The quest for integration in South Asia, economic and political, will be a far cry unless the relations between them are improved. SAARC lacks the essential prerequisite of a common threat perception, and this is one of the most important impediments to the smooth sailing of SAARC. The huge size of India has made it the source of perceived threat …

SAARC possibilities overcast by problems Read More »

Bimal Pramanik The  Hindus who were  uprooted from their hearths and homes in East Pakistan  due to religious  persecution  and  measures or  lack of them, taken  by the  successive Governments in  East Pakistan (Bangladesh)   after partition  in 1947 were  accepted as refugees by the        Government of India and  her people, not of course without grudge, and were given shelter,  citizenship  and were  gradually  absorbed in the  mainstream of Indian  people ,  particularly that of  West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. This was quite understandable.  But what happened after the birth of Bangladesh when it was the declared policy of the Government of   India  not to  grant  citizenship to any  people (even  if they were Hindus and were forced to leave Bangladesh as a result of persecution)  who migrated to India from Bangladesh as refugees after 1971 ?   In what way the migratory trend post 1971 was different from the earlier trends?    How were hordes of Muslims able to settle in the border districts of West Bengal and Assam without much notice and commotion? How was this silent demographic invasion possible? Was there any historical perspective behind this large scale infiltration or a well thought out design of our neighboring country? What change this invasion has brought up in the demographic pattern of border districts as well as interior districts of West Bengal and Assam?  These are the queries I have tried to address in this article. It is fair to affirm that the vast demographic changes in the eastern and north-eastern States of India are undeniable.  Yet there is ample scope for an analysis of facts and factors behind such demographic changes.  A novel outcome of demographic pressures became more and more prominent over the years among the Bangladeshi migrants settling in India’s border region. Amazingly, this has gone largely unnoticed, even though it reflects significant changes in the daily life style, and affects the very root of the civil society. I have tried to analyze the negative impact of gigantic  immigration from Bangladesh upon India’s attempts to preserve secular harmony as well as national security.  We do not intend to overrate the military potential of Bangladesh while assessing the impact of Bangladeshi immigrants upon India’s national security in north eastern and eastern States, but we can hardly underrate the significance of their disturbing and distorting   impact on the ethos of secular harmony that India stands for, and has been practising unabatedly since independence, despite Partition on religious grounds. This sordid impact of Bangladeshi immigration upon India is but a logical consequence of the stark failure of Bangladesh to evolve as a secular multicultural polity. The ruling circle of present day Bangladesh is determined not only to broaden and deepen the Islamisation of Bangladesh, but also to use Islam to incite separatist or secessionist forces in eastern/north-eastern India — by extensive support to a protracted arms struggle, if necessary.  It is an open secret that in Bangladesh many international terrorist outfits with aggressive fundamentalist agendas are making all efforts to envelop Bangladesh’s socio-cultural fabrics with new  Islamic prints and designs — though  at the cost of the liberal tenets of Islam. Following the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the     eastern and north eastern region of India faced a novel political and social challenge. At one time, critics and analysts             complacently characterized it to be a migration flow.  But later on, a series of political events proved that this was nothing but a kind of infiltration flow. As a corollary, it is equally imperative to understand the changing responses of the political parties and their leaders in this great drama of incessant demographic change, creating a menace to social harmony and national security. This threat to our national security and social harmony will not be clearly understood unless we analyze the role of Bangladesh in this regard.  Since the days of Partition, the  Muslim psyche in both the parts of Pakistan has been  suffering from a sense of injury about losing half of Bengal and Assam. They have been ruthlessly pursuing the policy of ‘lebensraum’ since the days of partition.  Acting, perhaps, on the philosophy of the great Italian, Machiavelli, who observed in the 16th century that “sending immigrants is the most effective way to  colonize countries because it is less offensive than to send military expeditions and much less expensive.”   Bangladesh with a single minded devotion has been following this policy, and, to say the least, it has been quite successful in this  endeavour. There was, however, not much concern about Muslim infiltration from erstwhile East Pakistan to India in the pre-1971 period.  For, an extensive migration of Hindu population into India was regarded as a natural fall-out of Partition. The destiny of Pakistan from its historic origin was thus      already blown off.    Only one thing was discernible, and that was the fate of  hapless and hopeless Hindus, whose sacrifice in the 1971 freedom struggle appeared to be negated by the assassination of Mujibur Rahman, and  who started moving as an endless flock of people from Bangladesh to multiple            directions into the land of India. Post Mujib complicated socio-political situation not properly followed by India: A new politics, a new economics and a new culture, taken together, started unravelling itself in India as a result of  secularism, which aggravated the confusion of the exuberant and extravagant politics of secularism of the erstwhile radical nationalist and the radical left in India.  Gradually, for the first time, the Hindu refugees were being treated at par with the Muslim infiltrators. This twin flow at the same time had introduced a new opportunity to show perversely that Bangladesh was as much secular as India.  Politicians, who placed immediate electoral gain above national interest, could successfully equate Muslim infiltration with the Hindu refugee flow under the grand title of infinite and indefinite migration of Bangladeshis with nondescript faces through all conceivable manholes in the  border region. A new era has started. Leading Bangladeshi strategic analysts and intelligentsia introduced the theory of lebensraum in the 1980s.  They …

Political Philosophy and thought behind Bangladeshi minority eviction and majority infiltration into India Read More »

Bimal Pramanik The people of India and Bangladesh have been witnessing many ups and down in bilateral relations between these two neighbouring countries of South Asia during the last four decades. Foreign policies of newly independent countries have often changed with the regime change—as in the case of Bangladesh. Therefore, no consistent policies were pursued towards India during this period. Only A few issues dominated Indo-Bangladesh talks, such as, water sharing, land border (Enclaves), deficit of trade, from the Bangladesh side, but issues of transit, insurgency, infiltration, smuggling etc.(though vital for India) always received scant importance. Bangladeshi leadership and governments were not at all interested in these issues. But one thing always gets importance in Bangladesh’s political and social arena, i.e. India-baiting politics and propaganda- even in the government level. For that reason, a deficit of trust between these two neighbours always affects their foreign policies. Socio-political circumstances of Bangladesh have been so peculiar that, when any government or leader takes initiative to strengthen relations with India, Opposition parties not only criticize, they also start a disinformation campaign against the government as well as India. Most of the people in the country believe this propaganda against India, because of their Pakistani/Islamic mindset. Consequently, bilateral relations suffer.             After the Awami League-led alliance (Mohajote) came to power in the fag end of 2008, the environment of Indo-Bangladesh relations changed. Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, visited India with a lot of hopes and aspirations. Warm welcome of Sheikh Hasina from the Indian side strengthened the foundation of Indo-Bangladesh relations. A lot of expectations were created among the people of two countries about solving the long-standing bilateral issues like enclaves, Teesta water sharing, Transit, boosting bilateral trade, and easy people- to- people relations. But the return visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Dhaka in 2011 did not yield much result due to the sudden opting out by Smt Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal, from the entourage of Prime Minister. Raising the negative aspects of the Teesta water sharing and enclaves, Mamata Banerjee created an adverse environment in the bilateral negotiations between two friendly governments. Subsequently, the Khagragarh (Burdwan, West Bengal) blast (October, 2014) exposed the link between the lower echelon of the West Bengal’s ruling party and Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), a terrorist outfit involved in a conspiracy to dethrone the Hasina government. Now the NIA is investigating the case. As a result, the image of Ms Mamata Banerjee was severely tarnished in the eyes of the Bangladeshi people. Apart from that, Bangladeshi media and intelligentsia did not like the dubious role of West Bengal’s Chief Minister. It was unexpected and unthinkable to them. It has created a big jolt in Indo-Bangladesh relations. In spite of that, Mamata’s visit to Dhaka in February 2015 was welcomed by the Bangladeshi intelligentsia and press (both print and electronic). Apparently, they wanted to keep bordering state governments of India in good humor, aiming to achieve better cohesion and understanding between the two friendly neighbours. Mamata Banerjee and her entourage tried to appease Bangladeshi people through an appeal to common cultural traits between two Bengals. She also gave soft assurances from her side to solve the problem of Teesta water sharing. However, it is a foreign policy matter, so assessment of the Central government is important. As a result, confusion still exists because of the contest between her earlier role at the time of Manmohan Singh’s visit and that in the present visit. Role of Bangladesh during the last general election in India in 2014: If we look back one year ago to the time of Indian Parliamentary election, the estimates of almost all the Bangladeshi political parties and media were anti-BJP and anti-Modi. They were soft towards the Indian National Congress (INC) and Mamata Benerjee (TMC) who were severely critical of Narendra Modi and the BJP. Bangladeshi media portrayed Narendra Modi as a rioter and killer of a large number of Muslims in Gujarat. It was exactly the echo of propaganda by the INC, Left Front and TMC in Indian politics. Bangladesh never wanted Narendra Modi and BJP to come to power in India, because, the image of BJP was not clear to them. They were all along comfortable with Congress. Attitude of Bangladesh government in their internal politics: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina declared that the government would build model mosques in all districts and upazilas (the number of upazila is more than 500) across Bangladesh to facilitate Islamic education. The prime minister said, “The Islamic Foundation has been directed to materialize the project. The government’s aim is to build modern mosques in every district and upazila in the country. Islamic and cultural education will be provided through these mosques. There will be separate places for women in these mosques.”1 it was a commitment of AL in its election manifesto in the last general election. Apart from that, mosque-based child and mass education programmes under the religious department of the government of Bangladesh are being continued. Establishment of 78 thousand education centres and recruitment of 78 thousands Maolanas/Alem-Ulemas have been continuing in this financial year (2015-2016) also.2  All the governments of Bangladesh have been trying to strengthen Islam officially in the social milieu of Bangladesh, suppressing other religious communities. Conversion of members of other faiths to Islam is generally encouraged in the society. There is a declared budget for converted Muslims also. A clear cultural transformation towards Islamization has been taking place in the society. This recalls an Afghanistan-like situation. A lot of incidents of atrocities on minorities, particularly Hindus, have been published in the newspapers during Sheikh Hasina’s tenures (1996-2001, 2008-2015). In this slough of moderate Islam, the AL led government, slowly but steadily, has been strengthening the very concept of Islamic Bangladesh, ignoring the ideals of liberation war. So, the people in general cannot come out from the clutches of Islamic fundamentalists. Sheikh Hasina campaigned hard against Jamat-e-Islam and war criminals, but not against Islamic fundamentalists/terrorists, who are …

A new era of Indo-Bangladesh relations Read More »

Bimal Pramanik and Purnima Naskar For a long time the glaring facts of Bangladeshi infiltration in West Bengal were restricted to brief (if not apologetic) reports in the Indian news media (both electronic and print) till the visible emergence of BJP in Delhi and West Bengal. And also, there was an undeclared prohibition on a discussion of Islamic terrorism because of the undeclared policy of Muslim appeasement of the Left Front, Congress and Trinamul Congress in West Bengal. Words like ‘infiltration’ ‘terrorism’ etc. were avoided by the so called secular parties due to vote bank politics. As a result, terrorists get safe corridor in this state and the normally high growth rate of Muslim population becomes higher due to infiltration; on the other side, this tends to strengthen to sectarian politics of Hindu too. Till today, not a single word has been spent by the Chief Minister of West Bengal on the  infiltration problem. Not even a single statement has been issued on the recent Khagragarh (Burdwan) blast and involvement of several private madrassas in West Bengal. It is a ‘dangerous silence’ for the state government. A hidden fear of losing Muslim votes is haunting her. Are the ordinary Muslims not against this terrorism? Why TMC failed to play a strong role against the vicious links of  infiltration and terrorism?  One simple logical proposition is, nearly all terrorists are Muslims, but all Muslims are not terrorists. Why should then the Muslim community as a whole feel irritated by any discussion regarding relations between terrorists and madrassas? May be someone related with these madrassas can be irritated. Apart from that, all Muslim youths are not madrassa students and all of them do not subscribe to the terrorist mindset. Why then the TMC suffers from a fear to lose Muslim votes?  Is there any need of madrassa education in the twenty first century?  The need of the hour is an open discussion on this topic. Where are the difficulties? Madrassas may be necessary for religious education, but terrorists are using these institutes to fulfill their purposes. It is not only true in West Bengal or India; it is also true in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Syria and other countries in the world. Now it is amply clear like day light, madrassas are used to spread terrorism in most of the South Asian countries. And majority of the victims are Muslims as in Pakistan. So, how many madrassas are really needed to teach religion in this state of West Bengal, and what are the ways to control them properly; it is not merely a subject/affecting non-Muslims, it should be a matter of concern to the Muslim community also. Terrorism represents a vital component of the problem of large scale infiltration though Indo- Bangladesh border. Though infiltration is a reality, it is not possible for the Indian people to welcome this  extra burden of population. A clear government policy should be enunciated on this matter, and a wide discussion is needed in the society. It is not simply a religious problem; it is a problem of society, economy and polity. Bangladesh Link:  In the nineteen eighties, planned migration from Bangladesh conformed to the lebensraum theory, which was encouraged by most of the Indian Muslims in the border states under the protection and patronization of some political and social forces of India’s Eastern and North Eastern region. This continuous infiltration from across the border is slowly and steadily changing the demographic pattern in the border areas, especially in the States of West Bengal and Assam. This changed demographic scenario easily lends itself to disrupting social harmony. Already it has taken a shape of demographic invasion in the region, which is threatening our secular polity and national security. This is a religio–cultural process taking place in a geographical space considered to be strategically important. Thus the emergence of Bangladesh has created in the North- Eastern States of India certain conditions conducive to Islamisation. At least three factors, facilitating the process of Islamisation, are obvious. First, strangely enough, whatever Islamisation has occurred in these parts of North- Eastern and Eastern India has happened within a secular political environment. Secondly, the appeasement of aliens for the purpose of garnering votes and the continuous anti-Centre stance have been conducive to the expansion of a psyche of Islamisation. Thirdly, a weak undefined and unorganized secular frame has failed to combat the process of Islamisation. A lot of information has been published on madrassa related terrorist networks  in West Bengal and Assam in particular,  and India in general. Now is the right time for discussion and thinking of its political and social implications especially in the context of  Bangladeshi thoughts in  the nineteen eighties regarding it. Leading Bangladeshi strategic analysts and members of the intelligentsia introduced the theory of lebensraum in the 1980s. They claim that their right to settle in India’s eastern and north-eastern states is to be considered as the natural course of overriding, what is to them, an unacceptable political demarcation of the border.        Growing population pressure and crippling poverty and pauperization of the marginal rural masses in Bangladesh encouraged, if not forced, them to put the agenda of migration as a life and death question. In the mean time, the consolidation of Islamic forces was apparent. Islamists adopted the agenda of a greater Islamic region as a grand political strategy. Although it was an emotional issue of Sheikh Mujib, later it became a political and strategic issue with the support of Pakistan. Besides, both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border are inhabited by a population which is ethnically, linguistically and religiously identical. It has thus become easy for the insurgent outfits to wage a proxy war at an unpublicized level. The costs and risks of this war are low, and yet it destabilizes the security of eastern and north eastern India. Harkat-ul-Mujahidin(HuM), Bangladesh Jamat-e-Islami (BJI), etc. and their counterparts in India are reaping benefits with the help of some local Indian political and social forces for spreading …

Socio-political implications of Khagragarh (Burdwan) blasts in West Bengal Read More »

Jayanta Kumar Ray National Research Professor, Government of India & Honorary Adviser, Centre for Research in Indo-Bangladesh Relations, Kolkata. In 1951, independent India carried out its first Census operations.  A National Register of Citizens (NRC), containing the names of Indian citizens, also came into existence in the same year, viz. 1951, under a directive from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).  The Citizenship Act 1955, and the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules 2003, will govern the preparation of the current updating of the NRC for the State of Assam.  Legacy data  form  the foundation of this updating, and comprise, as proofs of presence in Assam or in any other part of  India on or before 24 March 1971 the names of persons ( or their descendants) who appear in the NRC 1951 or in the Electoral Rolls or in the admissible documents up to the above noted date. A person who wants inclusion of his/her name in the updated NRC, has to provide the Legacy data confirming his or her ancestor’s name in the pre-1971 documents noted above. NRC compilation is divided into four phases: (1) Distribution and Receipt of Application Form; (2) Verification; (3) Publication of Draft NRC and Receipt of Claims/Objections; (4) Final Publication of NRC.  Digitised government data provide a transparent and technology-based process of verification of the legacy data submitted by an NRC applicant.  Thus, all potential citizens are given a fair opportunity. The NRC update is a highly controversial issue in Assam and various parts of India, especially in the neighbouring States of Assam.  The NRC published in 1951 lacks total validity because it is not deemed to be complete.  Members of indigenous tribes were not in a position to submit pre-1971 documents to prove their identity.  The Supreme Court of India has affirmed that, in accordance with 2003 Citizenship Rules, members of the Tea Tribes of Assam are to be treated as original inhabitants of Assam. Since 1951, Assam is the only Indian State attempting an NRC update.  This was the principal consequence of the 1985 Assam Accord, which itself was a product of the six-year long anti-foreigners agitation in Assam.  Although the objective of update is to identify, detain and deport illegal Bangladeshi migrants, Muslim leaders denounce the move as an instrument to render the Muslim community stateless. The issue has appeared and reappeared in various forms since 1905, when India’s Viceroy Lord Curzon divided Bengal, merged a part of it with Assam, and created a Muslim-majority province in north-east India.  Bengali Hindus fought hard against the 1905 Bengal Partition, and got it repealed in 1911.  Bengali Hindus thus saved the Assamese from Muslim domination, and preserved Assam’s identity and dignity. In 1937, due to the introduction of provincial autonomy under the 1935 Government of India Act, the Congress Party came to power in Assam.  An Assamese political leader became the Chief Minister.  But he could not counteract the domination of Bengali Hindus and Bengali Muslims.  One wonders whether the alienation of Assamese Hindus from Bengali Hindus, originating at that time, probably persisted till the Partition of British India in 1947, and Assamese leaders did not object to Sylhet (including Bengali Hindus) being joined to Pakistan.  But this meant an irreparable loss for Assamese Hindus as Muslim influx from Bangladesh upset the demographic balance in Assam, and provided an impetus to the updating of NRC.  At this juncture, Bengali-speaking Hindus and Assamese-speaking Hindus should make a common cause. The circumstances of the Partition of 1947 (as also pledges from India’s political leaders) confer on Hindus (and other non-Muslims) in Bangladesh an inalienable right to come to India as refugees, and then settle down.  More so because East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh has been carrying out ceaseless and ruthless pogroms against Hindus (an overwhelming majority of persecuted non-Muslims) in order to drive them out of the country.  In the early years of independence, some law makers in India had the pragmatism to maintain a distinction between Hindus (refugees) and Muslims (infiltrators). The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950 drew this distinction, and treated Muslim migrants as illegal aliens.  But this farsightedness of the Indian authorities did not last long; the Act of 1950 was repealed in 1957.  Yet, for some years, remnants of this farsightedness survived, unpublicised, in the shape of an administrative order of the Government of India, which empowered a district magistrate to grant citizenship to Hindus from East Pakistan residing in India for more than six months.  When authorities rescinded this order within a few years, they acquiesced in the creation of a situation in which, eventually, Muslim infiltrators would move to be a menace to India’s security. In Assam, even before Partition, self-seeking politicians orchestrated organised moves for decades to lure Muslims away from East Bengal to Assam, and thereby alter Assam’s demographic balance.  These moves persisted after 1947, and rendered unjustified the tendency of liberals to ignore religion while examining the issue of migration.1 In 1964, the Government of Assam enacted the Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan (PIP) Act.  The fate of this PIP Act demonstrated how Muslim leaders could use political blackmail to sabotage any effort by authorities to strengthen security by curbing infiltration.  Bimala Prasad Chaliha, Assam’s chief minister, played an energetic part in arranging deportations of a large number of infiltrators to East Pakistan.  He did not respect Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s desire for a liberal approach towards Muslim migrants, for, as Chaliha stressed, a severe threat to Assam’s demography and culture was emerging. But Chaliha’s determination failed to override the manoeuvres of Muslim legislators to stall the anti-infiltrator programme.  Chaliha’s Congress Party did not enjoy a stable majority in the legislature, and his health was fragile.  Therefore, 20 Muslim legislators of the Congress Party (in a legislature of 126 members) could threaten Chaliha with defections leading to the collapse of Chaliha’s ministry. The PIP Act became inoperative in a few months, after it came into force.2 Assam’s Muslim …

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Bimal Pramanik and Mintu Barua Immediately after Bangladesh became independent, a process was set in motion to include the country in the Islamic block. Although mainstream Awami League (AL) leadership tried to establish the freedom struggle on a nationalistic pedestal, culturally there was little transition from the Islamic psyche to the Bengali psyche in post-independence Bangladesh.  After the death of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, the process of Islamisation completely over-shadowed Bangladesh.  Although religion is an important subject matter for the common people of Bangladesh, there was a great chance of shaping Bangladeshi polity on the basis of the ideals of democracy and secularism, following the success of the liberation war in 1971, which upheld these ideals. A few people persisted in pursuing these ideals, but the dreadful massacre of liberation war leadership, including Sheikh Mujibar Rahman in 1975, drastically changed the fate of the ideal of secularism. Later, even the Awami League, which adhered to the ideals of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, failed to embrace the principles of secular political practice. Emergence of Islamic Extremist Groups in Bangladesh To a large extent, at the fag end of Pakistan rule and the early period of Bangladesh, AL did not use religion as the primary source of its political influence. The use of religion in Bengladeshi politics started after the killing of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman in 1975. Religious influence flooded the society, like tidal waves. Even Sheikh Hasina, leader of a liberal democratic party like AL, performed Hajj a number of times and wore hejab. She had to sign a five point agreement on religiosity with a fundamentalist party,  Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), for the purpose of holding the Muslim vote bank.1  Moreover, she retained such provisions as “Bisssmillah-er-Rahaman-er-Rahim” in the preamble to the Constitution of Bangladesh, and “Islam as State Religion”,  (15th Amendment in 2011), in spite of receiving the judgement for abolition of the 5th and 8th amendments which contained these provisions, from the highest court of the country. From all such events, we can easily gauge the overall situation of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib and other national leaders were killed due to an army coup. General Ziaur Rahman captured power in connivance with the Islamic and Pakistani Lobby. At the time of General Zia, Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist outfits engulfed Bangladesh polity and society rapidly. The concept of international Islamic solidarity began to gain ground in the society, and the role of political leadership was important in this regard. In the early 1980s, a lot of Madrassa students were recruited as volunteers to fight in Afghanistan and Jammu-Kashmir as a part of international jihad, which is an open secret today. No political parties and social organizations protested against these activities. Actually, most of the people thought that it was an attempt at building Islamic solidarity and unity. Gradually, a large number of students from Bangladeshi quami madrassas joined the international radical Islamic terrorist network, and thus Bangladesh got importance in the Islamic countries. Subsequently, a rapid growth was observed in the sector of Islamic NGOs. During 1982—1990,  Maolana Abdul Mannan, former AL Badr, 2  i.e. collaborator of Pakistan in 1971 liberation war, acted as the Minister of Religious Affairs in General H.M. Ershad’s Cabinet, and also remained the leader of Jamiatul Mudarresin (an umbrella organization of Bangladesh Quami Madrassas). Abdul Mannan played a vital role to organise jihadi cadres (radical Islamic terrorists) from Quami Madrassas for Afghanistan and Jammu-Kashmir wars, while he enjoyed the patronage of General Ershad. Expansion of Terrorist Networks in Bangladesh with the Connivance of Government After the defeat of the Soviet Union in Kabul, a large number of radical Islamic terrorists started to return back to Bangladesh from Afghanistan, Jammu-Kashmir and Pakistan. At this juncture, a number of new terrorist outfits emerged in Bangladesh, e.g. Harkatul Jihad, Harkatul Mujahidin, Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, etc. These organizations gained importance all over the country and abroad. Since the mid-1980s, Bangladesh state and society were getting recognised as a safe haven for all kinds of terrorists. A good number of the most wanted Indian terrorists settled in Bangladesh with the help of their friends or former classmates at Deobandh Madrassa of Uttar Pradesh in India. Their Bangladeshi friends played a very important role in providing jobs to them in Madrassas, and food shelter among local sympathizers. A good number of former Bangladeshi students of Deobondh fought in Afghanistan, Jammu-Kashmir and other places in India along with Indian terrorists. From the 1980s, for two-three decades, Bangladeshi governments and administration sponsored several terrorist outfits, including radical Islamic outfits, to carry out sabotage on the Indian soil. This matter is now an open secret. Nevertheless, Bangladeshi governments and administration always denied these facts. During Hasina’s tenure, from 2009 onwards, the hidden truth about the activities of radical Islamic outfits, and a group of Indian terrorist organisations from north-east India came to light.  On the other hand, Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) established foreign branches in Malda, Murshidabad and Nadia in West Bengal and different districts in Assam, which have now been disclosed by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) after it started investigations into the Khagragarh blast (Burdwan) of 2014.3 It is mentionable that during the tenure of the caretaker government (2006—2008) of Bangladesh, six top leaders of JMB were hanged after a close-door summary trial in 2007. After this incident, a good number of JMB leaders and cadres took shelter in West Bengal and Assam. After the Khagragarh blast, all these facts have gradually come out in the press due to the investigations conducted by the NIA. Internal and International Pressure that Unmasked Bangladesh   Leaders of radical Islamic terrorist groups in Bangladesh thought that Bangladesh had a conducive atmosphere for Islamic revolution, and therefore, they launched an offensive with the connivance of BNP—BJI alliance government.  The alliance government played a very minimal role to suppress it. Incidentally, when more than 500 bombs exploded at a time all over Bangladesh on 17 August 2005, international agencies sharply reacted. Bangladesh apparently worked as a terrorist state in …

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Bimal Pramanik Director, Centre for Research in Indo-Bangladesh Relations (CRIBR), Kolkata. A change in the demographic pattern of a country is an obvious result of migration, which is as old as human civilization.  But if the change is significantly high in a short span of time, it is bound to cause a social concern for the country experiencing this phenomenon. According to Pakistan (East) and Bangladesh Census from 1951 to 2011, Hindu population declined significantly in every Census period.  All the refugees who had been coming to West Bengal during Pakistani days were Hindus.  In the Bangladesh era, Hindus are coming as usual as in the days of Pakistan due to religious persecution and political pressure.  In the 1941 Census, under the British rule, Hindu population was 28% in East Bengal, i.e. in present Bangladesh.  Post Partition dismal picture of decadal Hindu population percentages is shown in the trend line:         Source :  Bangladesh Population Census 2011. As observed from the Bangladesh Population Census of 2011, the share of Hindu population has come down to 8.5% only.  During the last sixty years since 1951 (1951—2011), the comparatively lower growth rate of Hindus indicates a steady migration of Hindu population from Bangladesh to India, particularly to the state of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. On the other hand, in West Bengal, growth rates of Hindus and Muslims are 230.81% and 400.56% respectively during 1951—2011.  Population share of Hindus and Muslims in 1951 was 78.45% and 19.85% respectively, but during the last sixty years, the share of Hindus in West Bengal has come down to 70.54%—a  decrease by 7.91% in spite of a massive Hindu migration as refugees  from East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh after Partition of India in 1947, whereas the share of Muslims has increased by 27.01%—an  increase of 7.16%1 because of high growth rate and massive Muslim infiltration from Bangladesh to West Bengal particularly during 1971 to 2011. Changes in religious demography of West Bengal during 1951-1971 (trend line) are shown below. During the 1951-2011 period, the contrast between a decline in Hindu population and an extraordinary upswing in Muslim population is indeed remarkable in every district of the state of West Bengal.  In a number of districts, the rate of growth of the Muslim population is double or more than double that of the Hindu population. In the state of Assam, there is a significant trend of religious-demographic changes from 1951 to 2011.  If we consider the NRC period, i.e. 1971 onwards, it is a clear trend of massive growth of Muslims in Assam observed after the liberation of Bangladesh.  Examples from four Censuses of Assam, i.e. 1971, 1991, 2001 and 2011, illustrate the trend line of percentage of religious population, as mentioned below: 2 Only within forty years, Hindu population declined more than 11%, and there was an extra-ordinary upswing of Muslim population by about 10%. It is a grave threat to the very existence of Assamese Hindus.  Apart from that, the following nine districts of Assam have now more than 50% to 80% of Muslim population, although Muslims did not form a majority in 1971; in some other districts, there is a significant growth of Muslim population observed since 1971.3 Sl. No. Name of district Muslim population (%) 1 Dhubri 79.67 2 Goalpara 57.52 3 Barpeta 70.74 4 Morigaon 52.56 5 Naogaon 55.36 6 Karimganj 56.36 7 Hailakandi 60.31 8 Darrrang 64.34 9 Bongaigaon 50.22  There was not a single Muslim majority district in 1971 in Assam, but after delimitation of districts in 1991, five districts became Muslim majority only within twenty years from 1971.  After another twenty years, i.e. in 2011, nine districts became Muslim majority out of twenty seven.  We can cite an important example: before delimitation in 1971, there was only 16% Muslim population in Darrang district. In 1991, Darrang and Sonitpur became two districts after delimitation, and the percentage of Muslim population became 32% and 13% respectively.  In 2011, Darrang witnessed a massive jump of Muslims from 32% to more than 64% within twenty years only. Considering the above demographic situation, on 8 November 1998, Lieutenant General S. K. Sinha, the Governor of Assam, submitted an extensive report to the President of India on the grave threat posed by the influx of people from Bangladesh to Assam.  He said:           “The dangerous consequences of large scale illegal migration from Bangladesh, both for the people of Assam and more for the Nation as a whole, need to be emphatically stressed.  No misconceived and mistaken notions of secularism should be allowed to come in the way of doing so”. “As a result of population movement from Bangladesh, the spectre looms large of the indigenous people of Assam being reduced to a minority in their home state.  Their cultural survival will be in jeopardy, their political control will be weakened and their employment opportunities will be undermined”. “The silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in the loss of the geo-strategically vital districts of lower Assam.  The influx of illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim majority region.  It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made.  The rapid growth of international Islamic fundamentalism may provide the driving force for this demand.  In this context, it is pertinent that Bangladesh has long discarded secularism and has chosen to become an Islamic state.  Loss of lower Assam will sever the entire land mass of the North-East, from the rest of India and the rich natural resources of that region will be  lost to the Nation”4.  Just after independence of Bangladesh, on 8 September 1972, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, a senior-most leader of Bangladesh, was speaking in a public meeting at Paltan Maidan, Dhaka.  He said, “Bangla speaking areas of India and Bangladesh will form greater Bengal including Bangladesh, West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura.  Greater Bengal movement has already gathered momentum, army of Indira Gandhi will not be able to suppress …

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Bimal Pramanik and Kasturi Bhadra Ray The Partition of India in 1947 saw an onslaught of refugees from Pakistan (from eastern and western parts) into India. Displaced migrants started pouring into India in the wake of communal disturbances preceding and following Independence (Dey and Chakraborty1994).This has continued unchecked especially in the Eastern part of the Country,even after East Pakistan became an independent country,namely,Bangladesh in  1971. Though migrants from Bangladesh to India were primarily Hindus, Muslims also formed a part of the flow, mainly for economic reasons. The migrants from Bangladesh are primarily settled in West Bengal and neighbouring states, one of which is Orissa. A study was conducted among 400 women in Nadia and Murshidabad districts of West Bengal, and Kendrapara of Orissa, where there are large settlements of migrants from Bangladesh. The study tried to take a look at the work status of the female migrants. The study focussed on females especially, because over the years, the percentage of females among the migrants from Bangladesh to India has been on the rise (from 46.21% in 1971 to 52.79%   in 2001 in accordance with Census of India 1971-2001). Participation in economic activity of the female migrants in the survey areas has been examined and reasons behind different levels of participation have been analysed. In the study areas of West Bengal and Orissa, four blocks were chosen from the two district of West Bengal (Murshidabad and Nadia) in consultation with local people, officials and Panchayat members. In Murshidabad, the four blocks selected were Murshidabad –Jiaganj of Lalbagh subdivision, Raninagar II, Jalangi and Domkal blocks from Domkal subdivision .In Nadia, Chakdaha block from Kalyani subdivision and three blocks namely Karimpur-1, Karimpur-2 and Tehatta-1 from Tehatta subdivision were chosen. In Orissa’s Kendrapara district where the study was concentrated, one block, namely Mahakalapada block was chosen after consultation with the local people, officials and the Panchayat members regarding area-wise concentration of migrants. The women in the survey areas have been divided into groups of five year period. The age distribution is seen to vary amongst the different survey areas (Table 1). Table 1: Age distribution of the female migrants (Percentage) Age Group Lalbagh Domkal Kalyani Tehatta Kendrapara 0-14 0.00 0.00 0.00 – – 15-19 0.00 1.31 1.42 2.77 – 20-24 5.00 3.96 0.00 9.72 6.00 25-29 5.00 10.52 12.85 15.27 14.00 30-34 11.25 15.78 12.85 12.50 19.00 35-39 6.25 15.78 28.57 27.77 20.00 40-44 8.75 18.42 12.85 13.88 16.00 45-49 5.00 13.15 11.42 13.88 14.00 50-54 16.25 13.15 8.57 2.77 3.00 55-59 3.75 5.26 2.85 -1.38 3.00 60-64 20.00 1.31 5.71 — 2.00 65+ 18.75 1.31 2.85 – 3.00 Mean Age 49 years 40 years 39 years 35 years 37 years Source: Survey data The main concentration is in Lalbagh (30-54 years), but there is a substantial percentage (38.75%) in the 60 years plus age group. In Domkal and Kalyani   the women under the survey belong to the   25-54 years age category mainly, though in Tehatta, the women were from a lower age cluster (20-49 years). In Kendrapara, the respondents primarily belonged to 25-49 years. Quite a few women in Lalbagh belong to the 60 years and above   category, but this is for Lalbagh only. In the other areas, very low percentages of the women migrants belong to this age category. Also, in Lalbagh, Domkal, Kalyani, Tehatta and Kendrapara, none of the   women migrants   were from the 0-14 year’s age group. The average age of the women varies from 35 years in Tehatta,  37 years in Kendrapara, 39 years in Kalyani, 40 years in Domkal to 49 years in Lalbagh All the females chosen for the study in Lalbagh and Kalyani in West Bengal and Kendrapara, Orissa were Hindus, the areas being predominantly Hindu, but in Domkal and Tehatta of West Bengal the females were broadly divided between Hindus and Muslims. Table 2: Religious composition of the female migrants (Percentage) Religion Lalbagh Domkal Kalyani Tehatta Kendrapara Hindu 100.00 57.89 100.00 54.16 100.00 Muslim – 42.10 – 45.83 – Christian – – – – – Buddhist – – – – – Others – – – – – No Reply – – – – – Source: Survey Data 57.89% of the females were Hindus in Domkal, and 54.16% in Tehatta. Work Status An examination of the data on work participation of the women reveals a huge disparity among the female migrants in the survey areas of West Bengal and Orissa.Almost all of them are engaged in economic activities in Orissa, but in the study areas of West Bengal, only 25% in Lalbagh, 15.78% in Domkal, 7.14% in Kalyani and 12.50% in Tehatta are engaged in economic activity. Amongst the women workers in Lalbagh, 5.26% work as agricultural labourers. But the women are mainly engaged in the biri making (52.63%) and 42.10% work as maids or cooks in other households Table 3: Sector wise distribution of the working women migrants (Percentage)   Lalbagh Domkal Kalyani Tehatta Kendrapara Cultivator 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 Agricultural labourer 5.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.96 Household industries 52.63 66.66 75.00 0.00 1.01 Others 42.10 33.33 25.00 100.00 20.20  Source: Survey data                        (N.B: Women engaged in biri making have been shown under ‘household industries’ and those working as maids have been classified under ‘others’. N.B.2: In Kendrapara, the total is not 100% because some women are engaged in more than one occupation) The paltry 15.78% women, who are engaged in regular employment work in Domkal, also work in the biri industry or as maids (Table 3).  This is again observed in the case of Kalyani where the very low percentage who are engaged regular employment, work in either the biri industry or as domestics in other households.In Tehatta, only 12.5% are employed, primarily in livestock tending. So overall in the survey areas of West Bengal, where work participation rate is low, the women are mostly working as biri maker, as domestics or as livestock tenders. However, in Orissa, the distribution picture of the women migrants engaged in various sectors is very different …

Work Status of female migrants/infiltrators from Bangladesh in West Bengal and Orissa Read More »