The circling of the Chicken’s Neck and its repercussions

Dr Kasturi Bhadra Ray

Bangladesh Chief Adviser Mohammed Yunus, who is currently leading the country without an electoral mandate, has invited China, and went on to mention “seven states of India as landlocked”, raising New Delhi’s security concerns over the strategically important “Chicken’s Neck”( News18, April1, 2025).During his 4-day visit to China, Yunus urged Beijing to expand its economic influence in Bangladesh, controversially highlighting that India’s northeastern states being landlocked could be seen as an opportunity for the country. 

Yunus stressed that the seven states in the eastern part of India, called the seven sisters, are a landlocked region of India that have no way to reach out to the ocean. He described Bangladesh as the “only guardian of the ocean” in the region, suggesting that this could be a significant opportunity for the Chinese economy. Bangladesh has invited Chinese investment to revitalise the airbase at Lalmonirhat, near India’s Siliguri Corridor. 

Sanjeev Sanyal, a member of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s economy advisory council, questioned why Yunus mentioned India’s northeastern region. China is welcome to invest in Bangladesh, but what exactly is the significance of 7 Indian states being landlocked?” he questions.

The ‘Chicken’s Neck’ Or Siliguri Corridor

The ‘Chicken’s Neck’, also known as the Siliguri Corridor, is a narrow strip of land in West Bengal that connects India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. Pre-Partition, this corridor did not exist. It came into being only after 1947 (Vimal Khawas, Professor at JNU’s Special Centre for the Study of North East India).

Located in northern West Bengal, the corridor spans approximately 22 kilometers at its narrowest point. It is bordered by Nepal to the west, Bhutan to the north, and Bangladesh to the south. This corridor links the North-eastern Region (NER), which includes the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura, to mainland India.

The region is vital for trade, commerce, and tourism for West Bengal, Sikkim, Assam, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. All land trade between the North East and the rest of India passes through this corridor. This corridor is vital for both domestic and international transit and trade. It handles one million vehicles daily — including trucks, buses, SUVs, private cars, and two-wheelers — transporting 2,400 metric tonnes of goods and generating ₹142 crore in revenue.

Additionally, several oil and gas pipelines, as well as electricity grids, traverse this region. The absence of this corridor would significantly disrupt trade in key products from eastern India, such as Darjeeling tea and timber.

The chicken’s neck serves as the hub for a rail and road network that connects West Bengal and the rest of India to the North East, including Assam, Nagaland, and Sikkim. Also it is a key hub for the railway network that connects to strategic military formations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). From the New Jalpaiguri (NJP) railway station, various rail links extend to connect three significant military formations near the China border. From NJP station, a rail link heads towards Guwahati in Assam, which in turn connects to a road network leading to the strategically important town of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. Just 130 km to the north of the chicken’s neck lies Tibet’s Chumbi Valley, controlled by China, whose ongoing military infrastructure development in the area heightens regional tensions.

What is China’s interest in the region?

Over the years, China has taken strategic steps to jeopardise the security of the Siliguri Corridor. By constructing military infrastructure, including roads and airstrips, and bolstering its military presence in the Chumbi Valley, China is enhancing its ability for rapid mobilisation near the critical “Chicken’s Neck” region.

The Sino-India war of 1962 was fought because of the border disputes between the two countries. Since then, borders have remained contested, especially in areas such as Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

China’s growing military infrastructure near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction has significantly increased tensions in the region. The 2017 Doklam standoff highlighted the corridor’s strategic vulnerability, prompting India to bolster its defenses.

The reliance on a single railway line as the primary supply route through the corridor remains a critical concern, as it could be a key target in the event of hostilities.

In light of the recent developments between Bangladesh and China, New Delhi has terminated the transshipment facility for Bangladesh’s export cargo (Indian Express, 10 April 2025). However, cargo that has already entered Indian Territory under the earlier system will be allowed to exit as per existing procedures.

Previously the transhipment of export cargo from Bangladesh to third countries using Indian Land Customs Stations en route to Indian ports and airports enabled smooth trade flows for Bangladesh’s exports to countries such as Bhutan, Nepal, and Myanmar.

Former trade officer and Head of GTRI, Ajay Srivastava, noted that India had consistently supported Bangladesh’s interests and had provided one-way, zero-tariff access to Bangladeshi goods (with the exception of alcohol and cigarettes) to the vast Indian market for the past two decades.

“However, Bangladesh’s plans to establish a strategic base near the Chicken’s Neck area with China’s assistance prompted India to take stern note of it. 

The withdrawal of this facility is expected to disrupt Bangladesh’s export and import logistics, particularly with Bhutan, Nepal, and Myanmar, which rely on Indian infrastructure for third-country trade.

 The previous mechanism had offered a streamlined route through India, reducing transit time and cost. Without it, Bangladeshi exporters may now face logistical delays, increased costs, and greater uncertainty.

Additionally, Nepal and Bhutan — both landlocked nations — may raise concerns about restricted transit access to Bangladesh, especially as this move is likely to hamper their trade with the country.

Exporters in Bangladesh’s garment sector face a moment of reckoning over how they will manage urgent international shipments after India abruptly closed a transshipment route that had grown popular for air cargo. The route, via Kolkata and Delhi airports, allowed Bangladeshi exporters to move goods overland to India through the Benapole-Petrapole border and then air-ship them worldwide. It became especially popular during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, offering faster service and, often, lower costs than relying on the overstretched Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport (HSIA) in Dhaka.

Industry estimates suggest about 18 percent of Bangladesh’s garment air cargo was flown through Indian airports. Bangladesh exported roughly 3,400 tonnes of garments by air per week, with 600 tonnes flown through Indian airports before the transshipment ban, according to data from the Bangladesh Freight Forwarders Association ( ANN April 11, 2025).

Why exporters chose Indian airports

One of the main attractions of Indian air transshipment was the cost. While sending a kilogram of apparel from HSIA to Europe typically costs $2.90-$3.20 during off-peak periods (and up to $4.50 in peak season), shipping through India costs about $2.60 per kg, even after accounting for overland transport to Indian airports.

Major international buyers like Inditex (Zara’s parent company), which maintains a distribution hub in Delhi, preferred this route for speed and efficiency. Local suppliers relied on it to shorten lead times and optimise delivery schedules.

By contrast, exporters have long complained about bottlenecks at HSIA. The airport’s cargo village has a maximum capacity of 300 tonnes, but it handles over 800 tonnes daily even in the off-season and up to 1,200 tonnes during peak periods. Ground handling inefficiencies and mismanagement has plagued the Dhaka airport for years. Shipments have reportedly been left exposed to the elements.

Ground handling fees are another sticking point. Dhaka charges 29 cents per kilogram compared to just five cents at Delhi airport. Combined with slower service and a lack of modern equipment, these high costs have driven exporters to seek alternatives abroad.

Fuel costs also play a role. A $1-per-gallon difference in jet fuel prices between Dhaka and Delhi gives Indian airports a further edge.

The airport cost is driven by the high price of jet fuel, which is about 30 percent higher in Dhaka than in India. Jet fuel accounts for 40 percent of an airline’s operating costs.

On average, 1.75 lakh tonnes of cargo are exported annually from Dhaka airport, and Biman Bangladesh carries 16 to 17 percent of that total,”an airline official who did not wish to be named, told The Daily Star.

There are also infrastructure-related challenges. For instance, a cargo aircraft that exceeds the prescribed weight limit cannot land at Dhaka airport because of the runway’s limited strength.

Additionally, Dhaka lacks world-class retail brand stores, which means there’s little to no incoming cargo business. In contrast, when cargo aircraft land in India, they can bring in goods for stores in Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai, and other major cities, making the return trip economically viable.That’s why the operating cost of cargo aircraft is lower in India — they can carry goods both ways, the spokesperson added.

India justified this decision by citing significant congestion at its airports and ports, which it claims has been exacerbated by the transshipment facility granted to Bangladesh. The secretary general of India’s Apparel Export Promotion Council also mentioned that the move responded to a “long-standing demand” from Indian exporters to halt the transshipment of Bangladeshi cargo through Indian ports. The decision, he noted, would help rationalise freight rates, reduce congestion, and lower transportation costs for Indian exporters.

Nevertheless, this move seems to be driven more by political messaging than by economic considerations.

The repercussion of the Siliguri Corridor dispute poses significant and grave geopolitical risks for India, China, and the broader South Asian region. If China gains control over the corridor, it could isolate India’s eight northeastern states, disrupting military and civilian logistics and complicating defense efforts. This would fragment Indian Territory, intensifying security challenges.

The dispute also threatens regional stability, particularly for Bhutan, a key Indian ally, while Nepal and Bangladesh, which border the corridor, may face political or strategic pressures. Such tensions could destabilise the entire region.

Additionally, the conflict risks polarising BRICS, weakening its global influence. A clash between India and China could indirectly benefit the United States, which views China as a geopolitical rival.

Escalation could draw international intervention from powers like the U.S. and Russia. While India has defense ties with the US through QUAD and is a major buyer of Russian arms, China’s alliance with Russia complicates dynamics.

Third-party involvement could turn a regional dispute into a global crisis, exacerbating tensions further.